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NOTES
Conditional Sales and Mortgages-The Fixture Problem
"The books are full of decided cases upon the subject of fixtures, from
the yearbooks down to the present time, and, strange to say, after all the
ability that has been displayed upon this subject, no rule can be found
of universal application that clearly defines the line where an article loses
its legal quality as a chattel and assumes that of real estate." ' It is prob-
able, however, that much of the confusion on the subject springs from the
desire for a rule of universal application and the failure to recognize the
need for a different approach to the subject as the factual picture changes.
This note will discuss some of the problems that arise when chattels are
sold under conditional sales agreements and are annexed to realty which
i. Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 92 (1868).
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is, or becomes, subject to a mortgage. The latter part of the discussion
will attempt to indicate the approach of the Pennsylvania court to the prob-
lems under discussion, with special attention to the Pennsylvania statutes.
The American courts have very largely accepted the three-fold "inten-
tion" test as stated in Teaf z. HeWitt,2 the leading American case on the
subject, as the proper criterion of a fixture. The factors to be considered
under this test are as follows: (I) actual annexation to the realty, (2)
appropriation to the use or purpose of the realty to which it is connected,
(3) the intention of the parties making the annexation to make the article
a permanent accession to the freehold; this intent to be determined by
objective standards, usually by the application of the first two tests.
The intention test is satisfactory where the issue is between a buyer
and seller of land, or between a mortgagor and mortgagee, but when the
rights of third parties are involved it breaks down.' Where the issue is
between the conditional seller of the object and the mortgagee of the land,
to decide whether the object is realty or personalty seems to avoid the
issue. Consequently it is to be expected that there would be a certain
amount of sloughing off from the "intention" test and the setting up of
new standards designed more to answer the specific question as to who
is entitled to the article in controversy. To what extent this sloughing
off process has taken place and to what extent legislative action has aided
in this, will be brought out below.
Manifestly there are certain objects which under any standard would
be considered chattels or realty no matter how the question arose. For
example a brick in the wall of a house would be categorically "realty",
furniture in the house "personalty". Between the two there are articles
that could be considered realty for one purpose, and personalty for another.
It is within this latter group that the cases conflict and it becomes espe-
cially necessary to look more closely to the real nature of the dispute.
WHERE THE MORTGAGE IS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONDITIONAL SALE
There are two major classifications in which cases involving the con-
flict of interest between mortgagee and conditional vendor can be grouped.
One where the mortgage is subsequent to the attachment of the chattel,
and secondly, where the mortgage has been taken prior to the annexation.
Where the mortgage is subsequent to the annexation of the object, and
the mortgagee has notice of the reservation of title, he will be in no better
position than the original buyer.4
Where the mortgagee has no notice, the problem is whether the sub-
sequent party reasonably believed from all the circumstances that the
object in question was included in the lien he was buying. This question
has been answered by using the Teaf v. Flewitt standard of objective intent.
If under this test a given thing is determined to be part of the real estate,
a "fixture", the owner of the land has the power to cut off the conditional
vendor's right by conveying to a bona fide purchaser, or mortgaging to
a mortgagee without notice. 5 If, using an objective test, one would not
reasonably expect the article in question to be included in a sale or mort-
2. Teaf v. Hewitt, i Ohio St. 511 (853).
3; Niles, The Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 66.
4. Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033 (1928); Moller v. Mainker,
314 Pa. 314, 171 Atl. 476 (1934).
5. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. New England Bond & Mortgage Co., 276 Mass. 79,
176 N. E. 802 (1931); Wood Hydraulic Hoist & Body Co. v. Norton, 269 Mich. 341,
257 N. W. 836 (1934) ; XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Fazckas, 56 Ohio
App. 188, io N. E. (2d) 229, app. dinissed, 132 Ohio St. 476, 9 N. E. (2d) 2 (937).
NOTES
gage, the owner of the land has no power to cut off the vendor's rights.6
In this instance then the Teal v. Hewitt doctrine seems applicable and has
generally been given effect by the courts. Fundamentally the principle
seems to be that when one of two innocent parties must suffer, he who
made the loss possible should bear the burden. A contrary doctrine has,
however, been expressed by a few courts in protecting the vendor on the
theory that since the mortgagee's rights are derivative, he can gain no
rights the vendor did not have.
7
Practically the best way to avoid the disputes arising in this field is
to provide an effective means of giving notice to prospective mortgagees.
In a number of states, recording a conditional sale as such is not consid-
ered as notice, the courts hesitating to place what they deem a burden
on the mortgagee or purchaser.8 As a matter of actual fact the burden
is largely a figment of the imagination, since the recording statutes gen-
erally provide that conditionally sold chattels be recorded in the county in
which they are to be used. Thus in the case of fixtures the record would
be in the same office as the real estate records.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act §7,9 and statufes similar to it,
have provided what is probably the best solution by requiring the condi-
tional sale contract to be filed with the real estate record, thus insuring
effective notice. A failure to comply with the statute will ordinarily make
the reservation of title ineffective as against a subsequent mortgagee or
purchaser,10 although if the article is clearly personalty, the vendor will
be protected even though he fails to record."
WHERE THE MORTGAGE Is PRIOR TO THE CONDITIONAL SALE
When the mortgage is taken prior to the annexation of the article in
question it seems unnecessary to apply any objective intention standard
since there is no question of protecting a subsequent party who has relied
on appearances. There is a totally different problem, that of protecting
the security interest of the mortgagee. The problem becomes more one
of accession than of fixtures. If the security that the mortgagee bar-
gained for will be impaired by removing the object, the mortgagee, being
the prior lienor, should be protected. A majority of courts so hold.'2 The
6. See Niles, The Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L.
Q. 66, G6.
7. Godard v. Gould, 14 Barb. 662 (N. Y. 1853) ; Lawton Pressed Brick & Tile
Co. v. Ross-Kellar Triple Pressure Brick Mach. Co., 33 Okla. 59, 124 Pac. 43 (1912).
8. Kelvinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schrader, 225 Mo. App. 479, 39 S. W. (2d) 385
(1931) ; Schmidt v. DuBois, 201 Wis. 631, 231 N. W. 181 (i93o) (chattel mortgage).
9. 2 U. L. A. 12: "If the goods are so affixed to realty, at the time of a conditional
sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof and not to be severable wholly or in
any portion without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to
any portion not so severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against any
person who has not assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to the
realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof but
to be severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property
shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent purchasers of the realty
for value and without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale
contract or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly de-
scribing the realty and stating that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto, shall be
filed before such purchase in the office where a deed of the realty would be recorded
or registered to affect such realty."
io. Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, i18 Pa. Super. 405, i8o Atl. 38 (1935) ; Bruns-
wick-Balke-Callender Co. v. Franzke-Schiffman Realty Co., 211 Wis. 659, 248 N. W.
178 (1933).
ii. Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 789 (1929).
12. Evans v. Argenta Building & Loan Ass'n, i8o Ark. 654, 22 S. W. (2d) 377
(1929); Woodliff v. Citizens Building & Realty Co., 24o Mich. 413, 215 N. W. 343
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decisions lack uniformity because of the disagreement over what consti-
tutes impairment of security. This disagreement is due somewhat to the
changing concept of what is necessary to classify a given article as a fix-
ture, some indicating that incorporating the article into the plant as a
functioning unit is enough.13 The applicability of this standard to the
problem of the prior mortgagee will be discussed below.
When the article sold by the conditional vendor is to replace an article
which was included in the prior mortgage, it would seem that the argu-
ment that the mortgagee's security was being impaired would carry weight,
but thus far the courts have given the point only passing mention.14 It
is generally conceded, however, that an after-acquired property clause is
of no avail. 15
A small minority of jurisdictions have applied the Teaf v. Hewitt
test with logical severity even in the case of the prior mortgage.18 The
question of whether the article was a fixture or not is determined from
the standpoint of appearances, oblivious of the conflicting interests. If the
object is considered "realty" it is part of the mortgagee's security since
he has a prior lien on all the real estate. This doctrine has been ex-
plained by the courts as a logical carry-over from the "title" theory of
mortgages, 17 a poor rationalization since the same "logical" result could
be, and was,' 8 reached in a lien theory jurisdiction. Fortunately this rule
is not used when the mortgagee is not on record,' 9 but even so it has played
havoc with the precedents in the minority jurisdictions, since the courts
to avoid hardship have held that heavy and immoveable objects are not
fixtures.
20
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 7 was designed primarily to
enable a conditional vendor to protect himself against a subsequent pur-
(I127); Omaha Loan & Building Ass'n v. Bigelow, 133 Neb. 275, 274 N. W. 574
(I937). This rule applies, of course, with equal strength to chattel mortgages. Camp-
bell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (1888), in which the court states at 251:
"But it is difficult to perceive of any equitable ground upon which the property of an-
other, which the mortgagor annexes to the mortgaged premises, should inure to the
benefit of a prior mortgagee of the realty. The real estate mortgagee had no assur-
ance that there would be any accession to the mortgaged property."
13. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, i9
N. E. (2d) 273 (939).
14. Comly v. Lehmann, 218 Iowa 644, 253 N. W. 50, (934).
I5. Hachmeister v. Power Mfg. Co., i65 Ark. 469, 264 S. W. 976 (924) ; Prisco
& Soverio v. Bifulco Bros., 234 App. Div. 122, 254 N. Y. S. 459 (2d Dep't 1931). Bit
see Bullock Electric Mfg. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 231 Pa. I29, 8o Atd. 568
(1911).
i6. Vorsec Co. v. Gilkey, 132 Me. 311, 320, i7o Atl. 722, 726 (I934) ; Greene v.
Lampert, 274 Mass. 386, 174 N. E. 669 (1931) ; Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, no
Wis. 8o, 85 N. W. 698 (IgoI). Under the minority view the prior mortgagee would
be protected regardless of whether any damage would be inflicted, according to one
case. Gaunt v. Allen Lane Co., 128 Me. 41, 145 Atl. 255 (929).
17. "But it is well settled that, although the mortgagor, for some purposes, and
as to all persons except the mortgagee, may be regarded as the absolute owner of the
land, yet the title of the mortgagee is in all respects to be treated as paramount ...
And we think it is not in the power of the mortgagor, by any agreement made with
a third person after the execution of the mortgage, to give such person the right to
hold anything to be attached to the freehold, which as between mortgagor and mort-
gagee would become a party of the realty." Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. 522, 525 (i86o).
18. Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, iio Wis. 8o, 85 N. W. 698 (igoi).
'9. Security Co6p. Bank v. Holland Furnace Co., 274 Mass. 389, 174 N. E. 721
(1931).
20. Medford Trust Co. v. Priggen Steel Garage Co., 273 Mass. 349, 174 N. E. 126
(793o) (steel garages on concrete mountings) ; Carpenter v. Walker, I4O Mass. 416,
5 N. E. I6o (I886) (56oo lbs. of machinery).
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chaser or mortgagee by recording.2 ' It was not the purpose of the Act to
change the law as to prior parties, hence the first sentence of the Act per-
petuates some of the common law limitations on the power of the con-
ditional seller to remove a fixture. This was to insure that the Act would
not empower a conditional vendor to remove a chattel that had so lost its
identity as to become part of the realty. Thus, "If the goods are so affixed
to realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become a
part thereof, and not to be severable wholly or in part without material
injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not
so severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed, as against any
person who has not expressly assented to the reservation." 22 This section,
although not so designed, did serve as an excuse for the Wisconsin court
to depart from the minority or Massachusetts view, a desirable but not
necessarily a logical result.
22
It is to be remembered that under the Teaf v. Heuttt test, the second
factor was "appropriation to the use or purpose of the realty to which it
is connected." Many courts so emphasized this factor that it became the
prime test with which to decide the cases and physical annexation was
somewhat disregarded. The first sentence of § 7 of the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act quoted supra sets the standard of "material injury to the
freehold" as the test for removability. This sentence is broad enough in
scope to apply to either prior or subsequent parties, but is the only part
of the section applicable to prior parties. The question to be answered
under the Act then is whether or not there will be "material injury to the
freehold". The majority of the courts before the Act considered physical
injury the proper criterion in the case of a prior mortgagee, 24 and look-
ing at the Act as a whole it seems certain that such was the intent of
the commissioners.2 5  Despite this the New Jersey court has construed
"material injury" broadly to cover injury to the operating plant.26 Com-
monly termed the "institutional" view, this interpretation is an extreme
application of the second test laid down in Teaf v. Hewitt, i. e., appro-
priation of the chattel to the use of the premises. Thus if an article
which, although not attached physically to the premises, is indispensable
to the purpose to which the premises has been dedicated, it is a "fix-
ture". This test may be entirely proper in determining the rights of
the original parties, but as pointed out before, the problem when there
is a prior mortgagee is more one of accession than of fixtures. It is un-
fortunate then that such a construction was given to the act.
The Act has been twisted in some instances to permit even a subse-
quent mortgagee to take advantage of the institutional view. The second
sentence of the Act which is designed to protect subsequent purchasers
when the sale is not recorded, is broad enough in scope to cover objects
such as heating plants, mail chutes, etc. which would be considered "fix-
tures" under the institutional view. But when the sale is perfectly re-
corded and no physical injury will result from removal, the vendor is
21. Commissioner's note to § 7 of UNIFORm CONDITIONAL SALEs ACT, 2 U. L. A.
12 (1922).
22. UNInoRm C NDrIIONAL SMALs Acr § 7, 2 U. L. A. 12 (1922).
23. People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Sheboygan M. Co., 212 Wis. 449, 453, 249
N. W. 527, 529 (I933).
24. Omaha Loan & Building Ass'n v. Bigelow, 133 Neb. 275, 274 N. W. 574
{I937 ; Woodliff v. Citizens Building & Realty Co., 240 Mich. 413, 215 N. W. 343
25. A case so holding under the Act is Myrhe v. Michigan Silo Co., 22o Wis. 593,
265 N. W. 703 (1936).
26. Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 11S N. J. Eq. 313, 178 Atl. 788 (1935);
MacLeod v. Walter J. Satterthwait, Inc., log N. J. Eq. 414, 157 Atl. 67o (1932).
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protected since the subsequent party has been given effective notice. The
New Jersey Court in this situation has permitted the subsequent mort-
gagee to bring the case under the first sentence of the Act using the insti-
tutional view.27 This construction has been severely criticised.
Although, as has been shown, the Act has not been satisfactory in all
regards, it is a vast improvement over the common law in that an effective
system of recording is provided. The gaps and ambiguities can to some
extent be remedied by amendments such as the one adopted by Pennsyl-
vania. s
THE PENNSYLVANIA LAW
To understand clearly the position of the Pennsylvania courts in rela-
tion to the foregoing sections, certain fundamental peculiarities of Penn-
sylvania law must be kept in mind. The attitude of the courts of this
state has been steadfastly adverse to the conditional seller, and when the
equities of third parties intervene, the vendor's lien was held inferior.29
To overcome this disadvantageous position the bailment lease was re-
sorted to by the seller. When correctly drawn the bailment lease is con-
sidered as something entirely different from a conditional sale, 0 although
its purpose is the same. Here the bailor is protected even against inno-
cent third parties.31 It is for this reason that until the Conditional Sales
Act, as adopted by Pennsylvania, gave the vendor a way to protect him-
self, the bailment lease was more popular. This will explain the paucity
of case law on the conditional vendor-mortgagee relationship before 1925.
It is also of the utmost importance to keep in mind that the bailment lease
was not included in the Conditional Sales Act when adopted by the Penn-
sylvania legislature, thus the two devices exist side by side, one regulated
by the common law, and one by statute.
In accord with the majority of American jurisdictions the Pennsyl-
vania court uses the "intention" test as the criterion of a fixture.32 Thus
a bailment lease is valid regardless of recording or notice as against a
subsequent mortgagee, if by means of the "intention" test the article is found
to be personalty.83
The section of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act dealing with fix-
tures has been amended several times in this State, but the latest amend-
ment (935) has yet to be judicially interpreted. The litigation thus far
has arisen under the 1925 and 1927 amendments,3 4 which are similar as
27. Smyth Sales Corp. v. Norfolk B. & L. Ass'n, 116 N. J. L. 293, 184 At. 204
(1936). Justice Holmes took issue with the institutional view as follows: "The ques-
tion is not whether they were attached to the soil, but we repeat, whether the fact that
they were necessary to the working of the brewery gives a preference to the mort-
gagee. We see no sufficient ground for that result. The class of need to use property
belonging to another is not yet recognized by the law as a sufficient ground for author-
ity to appropriate it." Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233
U. S. 712, 717 (1914).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 69, § 404.
29. Ryle et al. v. Knowles Loom Works, 87 Fed. 976 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898); Ott v.
Sweatman, 166 Pa. 217, 31 Atl. 302 (1895).
30. Umani v. Clad, 98 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; Sanford-Day Iron Works
v. Fancy Hill Coal Co., 321 Pa. 2o1, 183 At. 770 (1936); Kindig v. Wertz, 116 Pa.
Super. 456, 176 Atl. 769 (1935).
31. Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailnt Lease (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
920.
32. Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363 (a prior mortgagee case; the case is specifically
set out on pages 366-368).
33. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Miners Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 Atl.
306 (1932).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 69, § 404, containing the 1927 Amendment.
The 1925 Amendment is to be found in 1925 P. L. 722.
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regards prior and subsequent mortgagees. It is probable from the nature
of conditional sales agreements that there will yet be litigation arising
under the two earlier amendments. The first paragraph of this section is
the one applicable to subsequent mortgagees and purchasers. It provides
that the reservation of title will be void if the goods are so attached "as
to form a part" of the realty, unless the record is filed in the prothono-
tary's office. 5 The statute as worded seems to eliminate any possibility
of a subsequent mortgagee preventing removal when there is proper re-
cording, as was possible under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act as
interpreted by the New Jersey court.8 6 No extreme case has as yet arisen
under this section, however.
3 7
Where the mortgagee is a prior party, what few Pennsylvania com-
mon law cases there are seem in accord with the Massachusetts view, 8
i. e., a blind application of the Teaf v. Hewitt test to a situation calling for
a test designed to protect the mortgagee's security interest rather than
merely deciding whether the object is "realty" or "personalty." The 1925
and 1927 amendments are in accord with the proposition that the problem
is one of damage and of protecting the mortgagee's security. The second
paragraph provides that unless assented to, such reservation shall be void
as against a prior party if the goods are not severable without material
injury to the freehold, unless such injury, although material, be such as
can be completely repaired and the seller gives a bond for such repairs
before removing.39 The provision for repair by the seller would seem
to make the test of what is "material injury" a question of physical dam-
age purely, but this has not been so interpreted by the courts who chose
to adopt the institutional idea of damage as did the New Jersey courts.
40
In so doing, the courts relied on cases not decided under the Act and
thus failed to give effect to what seems was the obvious intent of the legis-
lature. The Act provides for a bond for repair; thus, if material injury
is construed as injury to the plant 4' or property as a going concern and
35. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 69, §404: "First. As against a subsequent
purchaser, subsequent mortgagee, or other subsequent encumbrancer of the realty, for
value and without notice of the reservation of the property in the goods, such reserva-
tion shall be void as to any goods so attached to the realty as to form a part thereof,
unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, shall be filed, as required in sec-
tion six, [in prothonotary's office in county in which goods are first kept] before such
purchase is made or such mortgage is given or such encumbrance is effected. 'Subse-
quent,' as used in this paragraph, refers to the time of attaching goods to the realty."
36. Note 27 supra.
37. National Theatre Supply Co. v. Mishler, 312 Pa. 250, 167 Atl. 324 (1933)
(opera chairs in a theater).
38. Wickes Bros. v. Island Park Association, 229 Pa. 400, 78 Atl. 934 (1911);
Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Trac. Co., 231 Pa. 129, 8o Atl. 565 (1911).
While these cases were not decided the same way, they indicate the same approach to
the problem as used by the Massachusetts court.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 69, §404: "Second. As against an owner,
a prior mortgagee, or other prior encrumbrancer of the realty, who has not assented
to the reservation of property in the goods, if any of the goods are so attached to the
realty as not to be severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation
of property in the goods so attached shall be void, notwithstanding the filing of the
contract or a copy thereof, unless such injury, although material, be such as can be
completely repaired, and the seller, before retaking such goods, furnishes or tenders to
such owner, prior mortgagee, or prior encumbrancer, a good and sufficient bond con-
ditioned for the immediate making of such repairs. 'Prior,' as used in this paragraph,
refers to the time of attaching the chattels to the realty."
40. Medical Tower Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 1o4 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939) (Pa. law) ; Land Title Bank v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A. (2d) 282 (1940);
Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmore Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 3oo, 175 Atl. 697 (1934).
41. Although there was some indication that the institutional view applied only to
manufactories, the more recent decisions do not bear this out. Holland Furnace Co. v.
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it is decided that the object is an indispensible part of the plant, to com-
pletely repair would mean that the fixture would have to be replaced. The
purpose of "the Act to protect the vendor was thereby defeated.
It was with this in mind that the Act was amended in 1935.42 The
amended section states in effect that if the conditional sale is recorded
before annexation, the chattel shall not be considered as a part of the
realty or a part of the operating plant, and it shall be subject to removal
against any mortgagee. It provides further that if a prior encumbrancer
shall require it, the vendor shall put up a bond to protect said encum-
brancer from damage caused to the physical structure or improvements.
This clearly makes the test one of physical damage and is stated in such
unequivocal terms that there is little doubt that the legislative intent will
be carried out. The result of this amendment should be that there will
be much less litigation in this field since it does away with ambiguities
and necessitates only recording on the part of the vendor to protect himself.
G. N. G.
Concurring Verdicts as a Limitation Upon Grant of New Trial for
Insufficiency of the Evidence
In situations where the court may neither direct a verdict nor enter
a compulsory nonsuit because there is a disputable question of fact to be
decided by the jury,' it still retains a measure of control over the case
by reason of its ability to set aside a verdict of the jury as supported by
insufficient evidence. 2 Although this power of the court is recognized as
necessary to the proper operation of contemporary jury trial which employs
the general verdict,3 nevertheless jurists have been conscious of the fact
that: "Setting aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, is
Suzik, 118 Pa. Super. 405, 18o Atl. 38 (1935) (furnace in private dwelling); Land
Title Bank v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A. (2d) 282 (1940) (elevators in an apartment
house). But a church organ was held not to be an indispensable part of a church.
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Security-Peoples Trust Co., 133 Pa. Super. 18, 1 A.
(2d) 520 (1938).
42. "Goods to be affixed to realty shall not become a part of the said realty, or of
the freehold to which they are attached or are to be attached, or of any operating plant
of which they may form a part, but shall be treated as severable and subject to re-
moval as against . . . any mortgagee . . . until the unpaid balance due .
has been paid, if, prior to the said affixing or attaching of the goods to the realty, the
conditional sale contract . . . shall have been filed in the office of the prothonotary
for the county in which the said realty is situate: Provided, however, if an owner or
prior encumbrancer of the said realty shall demand a bond to protect him against loss,
resulting from damage which may be caused to the land or to the physical structure
of the buildings or other improvements to which such goods are attached by the re-
moval of the said goods . . . the conditional seller . . . shall deliver to the said
owner or prior encumbrancer a good and sufficient bond, conditioned for the imme-
diate making of such repairs. . . . If the amount cannot be agreed upon by the par-
ties, upon petition by any party at interest the amount shall be fixed by the common
pleas court of the county where the conditional sale contract is filed at the sum neces-
sary to repair the damage to the land or to the physical structure of the buildings or
other improvements to which such goods are attached. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, Supp. 194o) tit. 69, § 404.
I. McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N. Y. 66, 6o N. E. 282 (19O1); cf. Mc-
Peck v. Central Vt. R. Co., 79 Fed. 590, 591 (C. C. A. Ist, 1897) ; Stason, "Substan-
tial Evidence" in Adinii.trative Law (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1026, 1039 n. 44.
2. McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N. Y. 66, 6g, 6o N. E. 282, 283 (19o).
3. See Cunningham v. Magoun, 18 Pick. 13, 15 (Mass. 1836); Landrum, New
Trials (1902) 55 CENT. L. J. 323; Sweet, The Ditty of the Court on Motion for New
Trial (1930) 4 CALIF. ST. B. J. 148.
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not the daily bread but the extreme medicine of the law, and like other
powerful remedies, should be very sparingly administered". 4 A fear that
the court will substitute its judgment for that of the jury 5 and a hesitant
recognition of the fact that the power of the judiciary to set aside a ver-
dict as against the weight of the evidence is an encroachment on the con-
stitutional guarantee to trial by jury 6 have led to certain limitations upon
the power of the court to set aside verdicts as against the weight of the
evidence. It is the purpose of this note to examine some of these limita-
tions.
I. Co mol LAW LImITATIoNs
It often occurs that in ruling upon a motion for new trial the court
is confronted with the fact that the verdict requested to be set aside is the
second, third, or fourth verdict in the case for the same party. While it
is well settled that where there has been an error of law at trial or the
verdict is contrary to the charge of the court on a question of law a new
trial will be granted innumerable times,7 confusion arises as to the num-
ber of times a verdict for the same party may be set aside as against the
weight of the evidence.
Much of this confusion arises because the courts fail properly to dis-
tinguish between the duty of trial courts and that of appellate courts in
passing on motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. The trial court is in a position somewhat
similar to that of a juror. It has observed the conduct and appearance
of the witnesses, has heard the testimony, and is acquainted with the jury.
It is obligated to exercise its discretion in weighing the evidence and if
clearly satisfied that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence must
grant the motion.8 The appellate court merely decides as a matter of law
whether there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict.9 Thus
a decision that an appellate court will refuse to grant a motion for new
trial after a number of concurring verdicts does not necessarily indicate
that the same limitation is placed upon the trial court.
Cases which involve concurring verdicts fall into distinct categories
as follows: (i) cases where application is made to an appellate tribunal
either on a rule to show cause why the verdict below should not be set
aside, or upon a similar procedure giving the appellate court original hear-
ing upon the motion,10 (2) cases where motion for new trial has been
denied by the trial court or where such a motion has not been presented,
but approval of the verdict has been shown by entry of judgment below,".
4. See Tidball, New Trial Because the Evidence Is Not. Sufficient (192o) Rrrs.
Wyo. S. B. Assoc. 32, 34.
5. See Tuttle, A Trial Judge's Views on Motion for New Trial (1930) 4 CALr.
ST. B. J. 194.
6. See Kahn v. Traders Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 441 (1893).
7. See MOSCHZISKER, TRiAL BY JuRy (2d ed. 193o) § 365.
8. Tidball, New Trial Because the Evidence Is Not Sufficient (192o) Rprs. Wyo.
S. B. Assoc. 32, 33.
9. Ibid.
iO. Handly v. Call, 30 Me. 2 (1849); Adldns v. Phila., Trenton & Chester Co.,
8 N. J. Misc. 329, 15o Atl. 210 (1930) ; Brown v. Paterson Parchment Co., 69 N. J.
L. 474, 55 Atl. 87 (1903) ; Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 R. I. 481 (1863).
ii. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 196 Ala. 304, 71 So. 409 (igi6);
Southern Express Co. v. Stovall, 75 Fla. 1, 77 So. 618 (igi8) ; Keans v. Jones, 77 Ga.
go (1886) ; Jennings v. Estate of Glover, 214 Ill. App. 359 (1919) ; Hyde v. Haak, 132
Mich. 364, 93 N. W. 876 (igo3) ; Souza v. United Electric Rys. Co., 54 R. I. 51, 169
At. 484 (I933).
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(3) cases in which the trial court has granted a motion for new trial be-
cause the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and appeal is taken
on the ground that the grant of a new trial was error.:2
In the first two categories, the law is comparatively well settled that
where there have been two or three concurring verdicts the appellate tri-
bunal will not decree a further new trial for insufficiency of the evidence.'3
The reason for this result in the second category is apparent. All
that the appellate tribunal need find to allow the verdict to stand is that
there is some substantial evidence to support it.14 The same result in the
first category does not seem so well supported, for here the appellate tri-
bunal is not exercising its usual function as court of review. Having
original hearing upon motion for new trial, the appellate tribunal should
in this situation be governed by the same rules as those which control a
trial court in passing upon a motion for new trial. So governed, its scope
of inquiry is not limited to a mere determination of whether there is evi-
dence to support the verdict.
In view of these considerations, a different result might well be ex-
pected in the second category from that in the first. That the conclusions
are similar is less surprising if consideration is given to the fact that in
neither category has the court seen the witnesses, a fact which indicates
that a weighing of testimony would be impractical in the second category
as well as the first.
In the third category of cases, the attitude of the courts is completely
divergent. As a general proposition, appellate courts are extremely re-
luctant to disturb the trial courts' grant of a new trial for insufficiency of
the evidence, 15 and many jurisdictions hold that, in cases where upon the
same or substantially similar evidence the jury upon new trial returns a
verdict for the same party and the trial court again grants a motion for
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence, the second grant of a new trial will not be disturbed.'6 However,
the authority is divided as to whether the trial court may continue to set
aside as against the weight of the evidence concurring verdicts for an
indeterminate number of times without intervention by the appellate court.
Indication is that in some jurisdictions the trial court might set aside
as against the weight of the evidence innumerable concurring verdicts.
1 7
However, to avoid this type of protracted litigation 18 several states have
12. Hazzard v. Mayor of Savannah, 77 Ga. 54 (i886); Davis v. Central States
Fire Ins. Co., 121 Kans. 69, 245 Pac. IO62 (x926) ; Clark v. Jenkins, 162 Mass. 397, 38
N. E. 974 (894); Park v. Electric Thermostat Co., 75 Minn. 34g, 77 N. W. 988
(1899) ; Lacs v. Everard's Breweries, 2o7 App. Div. 250, 95 N. Y. Supp. 25 (2d Dep't
19o5) ; McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 73 App. Div. 305, 76 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Ist
Dep't i9o2); MeLucci v. DeCubellis, 12 A. (2d) 216 (R. I. I94O); Carr v. American
Locomotive Co., 31 R. I. 234, 77 Atl. IO4 (i9io) ; McCabe v. Lindberg, 99 Wash. 43o,
i69 Pac. 841 (I918).
23. See notes io and ii supra.
24. See note 9 supra.
15. Hall v. Desser, 8 Cal. (2d) 29, 63 P. (2d) 8o9 (1936) ; Davis v. Johnson, 332
Mo. 417, 58 S. W. (2d) 746 (i933) ; Martin v. Parkins, 55 N. D. 339, 213 N. W. 574
(1927) ; Carter Oil Co. v. Doyal, 247 Okla. 70, 294 Pac. 633 (2930) ; Iwanicki v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6o R. I. 498, igg Ati. 6II (I938).
I6. Davis v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., I2 Kans. 69, 245 Pac. Io62 (1926);
Clark v. Jenkins, 162 Mass. 397, 38 N. E. 974 (2894) ; Park v. Electric Thermostat
Co., 75 Minn. 349, 77 N. W. 988 (i899) ; cf. McCabe v. Lindberg, 99 Wash. 430, 169
Pac. 841 (1918).
17. See Davis v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 12 Kans. 69, 245 Pac. io62 (2926);
Clark v. Jenkins, 162 Mass. 397, 38 N. E. 974 (2894).
i8. See Hazzard v. Mayor of Savannah, 77 Ga. 54, 56 (1886); MeLucci v. DeCu-
bellis, 12 A. (2d) 216, 228 (R. I. 294o).
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developed the concurring verdicts rule.' 9 The rule, if such it may be called,
is a crystallization of the common law 20 providing that after a certain
number of concurring verdicts the trial court will no longer be allowed
to grant a motion for new trial and judgment will be entered upon the
last verdict.2 '
In recent times the rule has been applied after the fourth 22 or third 23
concurring verdict, but there is some indication that in Rhode Island it
was at one time applied after the second.2 4 Although indicated as having
a certain flexibility in that it does not apply to verdicts which are "clearly
wrong," 25 a careful examination of the cases cited for this proposition
indicate that what is meant by "clearly wrong" is that there was no evi-
dence upon which the verdict could be predicated as a matter of law.26
This then is no exception to the rule, but a mere restatement of the prop-
osition that the verdict cannot stand if against the law.
Proponents of the rule justify its existence upon several grounds:
it tends to end protracted litigation,27 it prevents the possibility that by a
continual setting aside of concurring verdicts the parties to the suit will
be denied the right to trial by jury,2 8 and it takes proper recognition of
the principle that in deciding questions of fact laymen are inclined to be
as able as the judiciary.
29
Antagonists of the rule adopt the position "a wrong committed, no
matter how often, never makes a right" 30 and indicate that to deny review
of a case is in disregard of powers expressly conferred upon courts of
appeal.8' In addition a cogent argument might be made to the effect that
here as well as upon a grant of first new trial the opinion of the court
below should be given great weight since it presided at the trial.
II. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
At least four states, Illinois, 32 Kentucky,33 Missouri, 4 and Ohio 35
have had statutory limitations upon the number of new trials which may
I9. Hazzard v. Mayor, 77 Ga. 54 (I886); Lacs v. Everard's Breweries, 107 App.
Div. 250, 95 N. Y. Supp. 25 (2d Dep't 1905) McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 73
App. Div. 305, 76 N. Y. Supp. 684 (Ist Dep't I9O2) ; MeLucci v. DeCubellis, 12 A.
(2d) 216 (R. I. 1940) ; Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 31 R. I. 234, 77 Atl. IO4
(1910).
2o. See MeLucci v. DeCubellis, 82 A. (2d) 26, 218 (R. L ig4o).
21. See note ig supra.
22. McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry. Co., 73 App. Div. 305, 76 N. Y. Supp. 684
(Ist Dep't 19o2).
23. Hazzard v. Mayor, 77 Ga. 54 (I886); Lacs v. Everard's Breweries, io7 App.
Div. 250, 95 N. Y. Supp. 25 (2d Dep't i9o5); MeLucci v. DeCubellis, 82 A. (2d) 216
(R. I. 8940) ; Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 38 R. I. 234, 77 Atl. 804 (i9IO).
24. See MeLucci v. DeCubellis, 12 A. (2d) 216, 218 (R. I. 1940).
25. Ibid.
26. Central R. R. & B. Co. v. Kent, 98 Ga. 687 (1893); Rounds v. Humes, 7 R. I.
535 (1863).
27. See note i8 supra.
28. See McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 73 App. Div. 305, 308, 76 N. Y. S.
684, 686 (Ist Dep't 8902). See also cases cited note 19 supra.
29. See Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 38 R. I. 234, 242, 77 Atl. IO4, 107
(I910).
3o. See Mr. Justice McLaughlin dissenting in McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry.,
73 App. Div. 305, 309, 76 N. Y. Supp. 684, 687 (1st Dep't 1902).
31. See McCann v. New York & Q. C. Ry., 73 App. Div. 305, 309, 76 N. Y. Supp.
684, 687 (ist Dep't 8902) (dissenting opinion) ; Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 38
R. I. 234, 250, 77 Atl. 104, I1 (19Io) (dissenting opinion).
32. ILL. PRAC. Acr (igog) § 77.
33. Ky. PRAc. CODE (Carroll, 8927) § 341.
34. Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1929) §§ 974, 1003.
35. Oaio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, I94O) § 11577.
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be granted. Both the Illinois " and Kentucky 7 statutes have been re-
pealed.
However, it seems wise to include some discussion of at least the
Kentucky statute as comparative legislation inasmuch as it contained an
express provision with regard to the number of new trials which might
be granted upon the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. This provision was,
" nor shall more than two new trials be granted to a party upon
the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence".8 s
Construction of the statute was severe, the established rule being
that even though the first two grants of a new trial were for errors of law
a third grant for insufficiency of the evidence would not be permitted to
stand, provided that the verdicts were concurring.89 Thus the party com-
plaining did not receive even one new trial for insufficiency of the evi-
dence although under the statute he was entitled to two. Even though
it has been recognized that the legislative intent in repealing the statute
was to "liberalize" the practice with regard to the granting of new trials
for insufficiency of the evidence 4 0 recent enunciation by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky indicates that the rule set forth still obtains.
41
The Ohio statute is somewhat similar to that of Kentucky, and pro-
vides,
"The same court shall not grant more than one new trial on the weight
of the evidence against the same party in the same case . . . ." 42
Although here only one new trial is permissable as compared to two in
the provision previously mentioned, this limitation is only that the same
court shall not grant more than one new trial. Thus a litigant might
obtain as many new trials for insufficiency of the evidence as there were
courts.
However, early interpretation was inimical to this proposition. If
the trial court had granted one new trial on the ground that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence and then declined to set aside a
second verdict for the same party on the same ground because barred by
statute, the position of the reviewing court taken in Cleveland R. Co. v.
Trendel 1 was that since the trial court could commit no error in refusing
to grant a second new trial, the reviewing court could not reverse the trial
court's ruling and grant the motion.
Recent application of the statute has been more liberal. In Werner
v. Rowley 4' the Trendel 45 case was expressly overruled. The court here
stated that although the trial court's power to grant a new trial because
of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict might be exhausted
by one grant, nevertheless the reviewing court would consider the entire
36. ILL. PRAc. AcT (1933) § 68.
37. Ky. Acrs (1936) Ch. 27. See Polley v. Cline, 28o Ky. 773, 134 S. W. (2d)
631 (1939).
38. See note 33 supra.
39. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Graves' Assignee, 78 Ky. 74 (879). See Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Daniel, 131 Ky. 689, 697, 115 S. W. 8o4, 8o6 (igog).
40. See Polley v. Cline, 280 Ky. 773, 774, 134 S. W. (2d) 631 (1939).
41. Ibid.
42. See note 35 supra.
43. IO Ohio 316, 128 N. E. 136 (892o).
44. i29 Ohio 15, 193 N. E. 623 (934).
45. See note 43 supra.
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record and, if the verdict was found unsupported, reverse the trial court
and grant a new trial.
The Missouri statute differs slightly in form from the two previously
mentioned. It provides:
"Only one new trial shall be allowed to either party, except: First,
where the triers of the fact shall have erred in a matter of law; sec-
ond, when the jury shall be guilty of misbehaviour . . ." 4
and again
"The court may award a new trial of any issue, upon good cause
shown; but not more than one new trial of the same issue shall be
granted to any one party".
4 7
These provisions have been construed to mean that a trial court's
power to award a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence is exhausted after one grant, so that a court of review will
not reverse a denial of second new trial.48  However, this interpretation
has been liberalized to the extent that a trial court may set aside as against
the weight of the evidence a second verdict for the same party provided
that such action is taken upon its " . . own motion . . . and during
the same term of court." 49
Further liberal construction of the provision is shown in that no lim-
itation to the effect that after two grants of new trial because of errors of
law the trial court may not grant a further new trial for insufficiency of
the evidence if there have been three concurring verdicts, obtains in Mis-
souri.5" Here the rule is that:
".. a proper construction of the statute gives the trial court the
right to grant fo either party one new trial on the ground of the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury, re-
gardless of the number of new trials that may have been granted to
such party upon other grounds.""'-
The repeal of the statutory limitations in Illinois and Kentucky and
the increasingly liberal interpretation of the provisions in Missouri and
Ohio would seem to indicate that there is even greater need for judicial
control over the jury than heretofore. Such action also indicates that if
the desired control is to be obtained, the power to grant a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence must be
reasonably unhampered by legislative enactment.
CONCLUSION
The underlying reasons for the existence of the limitations discussed
is that they offer a cure for the evil of protracted litigation, and tend to
add another buttress to the already unshakeable institution of trial by
jury. In vacuo these are eminently desirable policies. Upon a basis of
relative evaluation they would seem to justify the self-imposed limitations
of appellate tribunals as to the effect of concurring verdicts upon their
46. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § I003.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 974.
48. O'Donnell v. United Rys. of St. Louis, x52 Mo. App. 6o6, 133 S. W. II65
(Ign).
49. See Ewart v. Peniston, 233 Mo. 695, 709, 136 S. W. 422, 425 (1911).
5o. See page 88 .mpra.
5r. Kreis v. Missouri P. Ry., i31 Mo. 533, 544, 33 S. W. 64, 67 (895).
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rulings for new trial. They indeed may be said to justify statutory limi-
tations upon the power of such tribunals. However, it is problematical
as to whether these considerations justify either the concurring verdicts
rule or a statutory limitation upon a trial court's power to grant a new
trial on the ground that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence.
Of its essence, the power of the trial court to grant a new trial for
insufficiency of the evidence is discretionary. It allows a competent party,
accustomed to evaluating testimony and who was present at the proceedings
to have a measure of control over the prejudices, passions and misunder-
standings of the jury. Retention of flexibility in the number of times this
discretion may be exercised seems of very real practical importance.
J. W. S., Jr.
Remedies of a Mortgagee Who Pays Taxes
INTRODUCTION
Under early mortgage law a mortgagee who paid taxes on the mort-
gaged land was probably not entitled to recover from the mortgagor. Since
the mortgage deed purported to convey the fee, the mortgagee was con-
sidered the owner, and any taxes assessed against the owner were assessed
against the mortgagee.' In paying taxes, he was merely satisfying his own
obligation and there was no problem of restitution. Covenants were gen-
erally made between the parties providing that the mortgagor pay the
taxes; if the mortgagee paid them, he could recover in an action on the
express promise. 2 Equity first, and then the law courts, took the final
step.3 They realized that the mortgage deed was merely for security pur-
poses, that the mortgagor was still the real owner, and so the tax obliga-
tion should remain his.' Thus, at present, when a mortgagee pays taxes
accruing on the mortgaged land, he should be entitled to restitution from
the tax-debtor on the theory that, both at law and in equity, a person who,
not being officious, satisfies the obligation of another is entitled to restitu-
tion from that other.
5
If the mortgagee is not a volunteer in paying taxes on the mortgaged
property, he is entitled to recover the amount paid. There still remains,
however, the problem of the remedy by which he may do so. This seems
to vary with the parties involved as well as with the jurisdiction. The
variance depends not only upon theoretical analysis but also upon practical
considerations.
I. See Clopton v. The Philadelphia & Reading Rr. Co., 54 Pa. 356, 359 (1867):
"As such owner . . . the mortgagee was chargeable with the land tax,
This note does not discuss the problem arising when the mortgagee is in possession.
For a discussion of that situation see Anderson, The Pemnsylvania Mortgagee in Pos-
session (1937) iI TEmdPLE L. Q. 491; Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 780.
2. First Nat'l Bank v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 38 Ariz. 77, 297 Pac. 864
(931); Gilmour v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Colo. App. 301, 121 Pac. 767 (1912). But cf.
Hitchcock v. Merrick, 18 Wis. 357 (1864).
3. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERrY (2d ed. 192o) § 599, p. 2360 and n. 5.
4. 3 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1263, p. 2515: "Where the land is taxed,
the mortgagor should pay the taxes on mortgaged land unless the statute provides
otherwise; and the mortgagee is not liable for the taxes; . .
5. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 2, comment a; Hope, Officiouswss (1929)
15 CORN. L. Q. 25, 205.
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Mortgagee's Privilege to Pay Taxes
Real property taxes are not liens upon the land unless made such by
statute." Actually, they are generally made first liens 7 even though the
tax was assessed subsequent to the recording of a mortgage." Generally,
then, a sale for non-payment of taxes would divest a mortgagee of his lien.
To prevent this it is often necessary for him to pay the taxes upon the
mortgagor's failure to do so. Under such circumstances, the mortgagee is
not a volunteer or officious intermeddler 9 and is therefore said to have a
privilege to make the payment.
Where a sale under the tax lien will not divest him of his security, the
mortgagee would seem to be a volunteer if he took it upon himself to pay
the taxes. However, if the mortgagee pays the tax under the belief that
it is on property covered by his mortgage,10 when in fact it is not, he may
still recover, for had the facts been as he thought they were he would have
had the privilege to pay."
Of course, the above result is reached by the application of general
quasi-contract law,12 and there is nothing about it peculiar to taxes and
mortgages. However, the instant facts give additional reasons for the rule
because the debt satisfied is one owed to the state or other governing body.
Since governments are dependent on taxes as their chief source of revenue,
it is desirable that they be paid promptly. Thus, not only is it easy to
understand why the courts sometimes go out of their way to encourage
payments by the mortgagee, but it is difficult to see why they often go out
of their way to discourage the practice.
WHEN PAYMENT Is BEFORE FoRECLOSURE
Ordinarily then, the mortgagee is privileged to pay the taxes when the
mortgagor fails to do so, and may recover the amount so expended from
the mortgagor whose duty it was to pay.
Under the law of quasi-contracts the mortgagee would apparently
have a remedy in general assumpsit.' 3 And, according to the rules of
equity, he should be subrogated into the rights of the original creditor. 14
However, in spite of the fact that his recovery is based upon the same
equities as recoveries by quasi-contract and subrogation,'5 he is generally
denied these rights. The majority of jurisdictions argue that, since the
privilege to pay the taxes is given to him because of his status as mortgagee,
he should be allowed recovery only in- that status.' 6 Thus, although some
6. 3 CooLEY, TAxATION (4th ed. 1924) §§ 123o (and n. 2 thereto), i24o n. 65.
7. Id. at i240 n. 65.
8. See Int re Prince & Walter, 131 Fed. 546, 549 (D. C. Penna. i9o4).
9. See note 5 stpra.
io. Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Swenson, 222 Wis. 331, 267 N. W. 307 (1936).
The case is decided on the basis of RESTATEmENT, REsTITuTION (Tent. Draft No. i,
1936) § 38 (I). This is § 43 of the official draft.
ii. This is in accordance with the general rules of quasi-contracts (WooDWARD,
QuAsi-CoNTRACrs (1913) § i0) and subrogation (HAmus, SUBRoGATION (1889) § 340,
p. 224).
12. See notes io and ii supra.
13. WOODwARD, QuAsi-CoNTRAcrs (1913) § 248.
14. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (937) § 162.
15. WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 24, P. 115.
16. Monroe v. Busick, 225 Iowa 791, 281 N. W. 486 (1938); McCrossen v. Har-
ris, 35 Kan. 178, io Pac. 583 (1886); Vincent v. Moore, 51 Mich. 618, 17 N. W. 81
(1883) ; Hill v. Townley, 45 Minn. 167, 47 N. W. 653 (89I) (decided on basis of a
special statute of limitations for mortgages and a statute expressly allowing recovery
for taxes in an action to recover the mortgage debt) ; Horrigan v. Wellmuth, 77 Mo.
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of the majority jurisdictions do speak of subrogating the mortgagee to *the
rights of the state, in fact they only permit him to attach the amount of
paid taxes to his mortgage debt. This means that the mortgagee can only
recover for the tax payment when he recovers on the mortgage. Often
the mortgage debt will not be due for a considerable time, and the mort-
gagee must wait for repayment of the amount advanced, thus enabling the
mortgagor to force the mortgagee to give an additional loan on the same
security. The harshness of the result may be alleviated by the insertion
of an acceleration clause 17 permitting foreclosure when the mortgagor is
behind in his taxes. This would not be unfair to the mortgagor since
nonpayment of taxes is generally a sign of tremendous decline in the value
of the property and weakened credit of the mortgagor.
It frequently happens that the mortgagee does not add the amount of
paid taxes to his deficiency judgment after foreclosure. Later, he dis-
covers his error and wishes to secure a second judgment for that sum. In
this case a refusal to allow the second action may be justified by the un-
desirability of permitting a plaintiff to assert his claim in two suits when
one will suffice.
Often the mortgagee is desirous of securing the state's preference when
the debtor-taxpayer is insolvent.1 8  Since this would merely be subro-
gating the mortgagee into already existing rights for the amount of the
taxes, creditors would not be adversely affected. However, some states
will not allow subrogation to this right on the theory that the preference
is given to the state as a sovereign and that no one may be subrogated
to it.'" In view of the policy mentioned above, it seems a different result
would be desirable so as to give the mortgagee a greater inducement to pay
the taxes. And this is especially so where, as in this instance, no harm is
done anyone by conferring the right upon him.
WHEN PAYMENT Is AT FORECLOSURE
The amount due for taxes is generally paid first, out of the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale under the mortgage. This amounts to payment by
the mortgagee since it reduces the amount he realizes from the sale, and
should entitle him to be subrogated to the rights of the state. The mort-
gagee does secure recompense through an increase in the amount of the
deficiency judgment awarded him and, where the tax-debtor is the mort-
gagor, the result is theoretically good. Of course, if the mortgagor is
insolvent, which is probably the usual situation, any remedy against him
is worthless.
If the mortgagor has conveyed his interest to an assuming grantee,
the above situation becomes more complex. In such an instance the tax
debt may be one arising when the mortgagor was in possession, or it may
be one accruing after the grantee received the land. Where the tax accrued
before the transfer, the mortgagor remains liable for the tax. The addi-
tional complication arises out of the fact that the grantee is primarily liable
542 (1883) ; Criswell v. McKnight, i2o Neb. 317, 232 N. W. 586 (1930) ; First Caro-
linas Jt. St. Land Bank v. McNiel, 177 S. C. 332, 181 S. E. 21 (935) ; Stone v. Tilley,
ioo Tex. 487, 101 S. W. 201 (907); Hitchcock v. Merrick, i8 Wis. 357 (1864).
17. Note, Acceleratoi Clauses in Notes and Mortgages (1939) 88 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 94.
i8. To the effect that this priority is independent of statute see 3 CooLair, TAxA-
TION (4 th ed. 1924) § 1231.
ip. See Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369, 372, 53 Atl. 89, 90o (i9o2).
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for the mortgage debt.20 Under the "recovery for taxes and mortgage debt
in the same action" theory, this is generally taken care of by a joint judg-
ment against both the mortgagor and his grantee. The same reasoning
is involved when the tax is one accruing after the transfer, although the
grantee is liable for the tax while the mortgagor-grantor may not be.
21
If the mortgagor has conveyed his land to a non-assuming grantee, it
makes considerable difference whether or not payment out of the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale is looked upon as payment by the mortgagee. If it
is not considered payment by him, then limiting the mortgagee to recovery
from the mortgagor on the deficiency judgment is the logical result.
22
Since a tax debt accruing after the transfer is the personal liability of the
non-assuming grantee, the mortgagor would probably then be permitted
recovery from him. In view of the general desire to avoid circuity of
litigation, it would seem much simpler to say that payment out of the pro-
ceeds is payment by the mortgagee and give him a separate action for that
amount against the non-assuming grantee. Refusal to permit the separate
action would really work a hardship in those cases where the mortgagor is
insolvent, in which event the mortgagee goes supperless to bed.
WHEN PAYMENT Is AFTER FORECLOSURE
When land is sold under a mortgage foreclosure, the proceeds may
or may not be applied first to the payment of prior tax liens. In the latter
case, the land is conveyed "under and subject to" the lien and becomes in
effect the primary debtor. In the former case, the lien may be divested in
full or only to the extent that it is paid.
23
Let us consider the possibilities of recourse when, the sale having
been "under and subject", the taxes are subsequently paid by the purchaser
to protect his title. The general rule, whether the purchaser be the mort-
gagee or an outsider, is that the bid at the sale equalled the value of the
land less the amount of the accrued taxes.2 4 Thus, when the tax is finally
paid, there is no recovery from the tax-debtor. The situation is analogous
to that where a non-assuming grantee pays the mortgagor an amount equal
to the value less the mortgage. The land being the principal debtor, re-
covery after paying the debt would be from his own land. A party cannot
purchase land at a reduced rate because there are liens upon it and then
claim from the seller the amount paid to satisfy the liens. This would, in
effect, be making the seller pay twice.
25
Supposing, however, the proceeds of the sale are to be applied to the
payment of taxes. The situation is now a trifle more complex. The sale
may yield more or less than the tax lien. Or it may result in a sum just
equal to it. If the lien is fully satisfied, the situation reduces itself to that
considered when payment is at the foreclosure sale.
It is possible that the property will be sold for less than the tax debt.
As to the amount that is received, the mortgagee is in the same position as
20. For a discussion of this liability see Note, Related Problems in the Assump-
tion of a Mortgage Debt (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 6I.
2z. See Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 780, 785, for a discussion of attempts
by the mortgagor to relieve himself of the burden of taxation when the land becomes
worth less than the taxes. The conclusion is reached that unless he rids himself of
all interests by the transfer of title, he will not be relieved of the duty of paying taxes.
22. Stone v. Tilley, ioo Tex. 487, 1O S. W. 201 (1907).
23. 3 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1239, p. 2466.
,4. Semans v. Harvey, 52 Ind. 331, 334 (1876).
25. See Natick Five Cents Savings Bank v. Bailey, 307 Mass. 500, 504, 3o N. E.
(2d) .383, 385 (940).
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before. But, if the purchaser pays the rest of the taxes, may he recover
the amount from the original tax-debtor? Is the answer any different if
the purchaser is the mortgagee?
The answers depend on the meaning of the bid at the sale. We saw
before, that where none of the proceeds are to go for taxes, the bid repre-
sents the value of the land less the amount due for taxes. If the sale is
one in which all prior liens are divested, whether or not they are fully
satisfied, then the bid represents the value of the land. Which of the two
meanings should this bid have? Or should it have neither of them? In
the first case, when the tax equals the value of the land, the bid could be
nothing but zero. In the situation now under discussion either a bid of
zero or a bid equal to the value of the land could be logically supported.
Our problem arises, of course, only when the bid is less than the taxes, but
more than zero. It might be that this sum represents the total value of the
land, free and clear, to the purchaser. Or it might mean that the land is
worth the full amount of the taxes but that the purchaser does not have
the ready cash to pay it all. Under the first interpretation, recovery should
be permitted when the taxes are finally paid; under the second, it should
not. " '
The courts do not appear to make the above distinctions. In general,
the mortgagee cannot recover the amount. The result is based on the
assumption that the amount of the lien is deducted from the value of the
land when the bid is made and that the judicial sale is without warranties.
Thus, the purchaser takes whatever the debtor had to sell. If he wants
more, he must pay the additional sum required to free the land of the tax
lien.2 7 The same result will probably be reached by these courts if the
purchaser at the sale is an outsider.
Pennsylvania, however, allowed recovery in this situation against a
non-assuming grantee who was personally liable for the taxes.28  The
court did not even consider the possibility that the mortgagee might have
decreased his bid because of the lien. Obviously, the result is correct so
long as the bid is interpreted to equal the absolute value of the land, free
and clear of the lien. Since the court relied upon the fact that the mort-
gagee could have paid the taxes before the sale and then have recovered
the amount paid, it is possible that, when the purchaser is other than the
mortgagee, a different result will be reached.
WHEN PAYMENT Is BY PURCHASE AT TAX SALE
In addition to being personally liable for the taxes the mortgagor
owes a duty to the mortgagee not to permit the land to become encumbered
so as to impair the mortgagee's security. Therefore, the rule that he
cannot set up a tax deed to cut off the mortgage lien is logical and salutary.
Such a purchase upon a tax sale by the mortgagor is considered merely a
payment of the taxes.
26. Going back to the analogy of the non-assuming grantee, we find little to help
us. It is just as difficult to interpret a purchase price equal to more than the value of
the equity of redemption. As between the mortgagor and his grantee, is the land the
primary debtor or is the mortgagor? The same possibilities are open to us here as
in the tax situation.
Of course, a discussion of this nature must be based on the theory of free bidding.
It is admitted that in fact there is probably little or no free bidding.
27. RoRmR, JUDICIAL AND EXFuTiON SALES (1873) § 458; Notes (igio) 15 Ann.
Cas. 525, (19Ol) io L. R. A. (N. s.) 679.
28. Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255 (188i).
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At least two states, however, have permitted transactions apparently
designed to circumvent this result. Thus, in Wisconsin,29 the wife of the
tax-debtor bought the tax title and entered into possession with her hus-
band acting as her general manager. Because she purchased the title with
her own funds, the court said that the fact that her husband could not buy
a good title would not bar her from doing so. Although the court did
require that the purchase be in good faith, just what facts would indicate
bad faith, if the instant situation did not, is not at all clear. And, in Iowa, 0
the wife, who joined in the mortgage deed but did not make herself liable
for taxes, purchased the title from the holder of the tax deed. Although
the husband would only be considered as having redeemed the land from
the tax sale, the court held that the wife received a title free from the
mortgage lien. Here also the court required the parties to act in good
faith. Once again, however, the question arises as to what would be
necessary to prove bad faith. Perhaps there should be a presumption that
the parties acted in bad faith. At least one case stated the wife's incapacity
to purchase good title at such a sale as a matter of law.31
The mortgagee is under no duty to pay the taxes. That he has the
privilege of so doing would not seem sufficient to bar him from buying a
good title at a tax sale. However, to discourage the mortgagee from wait-
ing until the sale before paying the taxes, most states 32 will not permit
him to buy a clear title. This "purchase", therefore, only amounts to pay-
ment of the tax debt and the mortgagee is in the same position he would
have been in had he paid without a sale. Tiffany says:
"The courts do not clearly explain the grounds upon which this
view is based, and not infrequently say little more than that since the
mortgagor and mortgagee have a common interest in the payment of
taxes and in the protection of the property against tax titles, it is
inequitable for one to acquire such a title and to assert it against the
other, without, however, explaining why it is inequitable for the mort-
gagee, who owes no duty to the mortgagor to pay the taxes, thus to
take advantage of the mortgagor's default in this regard. Occasion-
ally the courts speak as if there were some sort of trust relation be-
tween the parties, which, however, is not the case. The more satis-
factory ground upon which to base the doctrine of these decisions
appears to be that, it being for the advantage of the state that taxes
be promptly paid, and the right to purchase at tax sale being unneces-
sary for the protection of the mortgagee, it is against public policy to
allow the mortgagee . . . to acquire a tax title . . . . ,
Since the mortgagor himself cannot buy a good tax title, his grantee,
if he assumes the mortgage, is generally held unable to do so,"4 and this
result seems to be both logical and desirable. However, a grantee who
takes under and subject to, but not assuming, a mortgage has been per-
29. Wood v. Armour, 88 Wis. 488, 6o N. W. 791 (1894).
30. Wood v. Schwartz, 212 Iowa 462, 236 N. W. 491 (1931).
31. Adams v. Sims, 177 Ark. 652, 9 S. W. (2d) 329 (1928), (1929) 42 HARv. L.
REv. 583.
32. Cases from i8 states have been found on this point; ii of these states, Ark.,
Conn., Ill., Iowa, Mich., N. H., R. I., S. D., Wash., W. Va., Wis., will not permit a
mortgagee to buy a good title; Fla., Kan., La., N. Y., Okla., Penna., Tenn., will let
him do so. See 5 TnF.NY, LAw oF REAL PRoPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1425 n. 3 and n. 6.
33. 5 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1425, pp. 340, 341.
34. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Parks, 134 Ore. 144, 292 Pac. 304 (I93O). Sim-
ilar decisions have been handed down in Iowa, Kan., Me., Md., Mich., Minn., Nev..
Wis. See 5 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § i425 n. I.
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mitted to purchase a title free and clear at the tax sale.35 Such a result
allows the non-assuming grantee, by his own fault, to divest his land of a
lien otherwise on it, although the reason preventing the mortgagor or his
assuming grantee from buying is still present. The different result is based
on the theory that, there being no privity between the non-assuming grantee
and the mortgagee, the grantee owes no duty to the mortgagee to pay the
taxes.38 On the same reasoning, these jurisdictions should also permit the
mortgagee to buy a good tax title.
3 7
Of course, if the mortgagee cannot buy a good title, the use of a
strawman will not be allowed.38  But if there is no fraud or collusion, he
can acquire clear title from a purchaser at such sale, even if the transaction
occurs immediately after the tax sale.39 The use of this insulation does
not seem justified. If the courts permit it, they should go all the way and
allow a direct purchase. Since they do not wish to do so, and consider a
direct purchase as payment of the taxes, the logical result here would be to
say that the indirect purchase is merely a redemption from the tax sale.
WHEN THERE Is MORE THAN ONE MORTGAGEE
As may be expected, some of these states which permit the senior
mortgagee restitution only by way of tacking also limit a junior mort-
gagee's right in the same manner. 40  Such a ruling may be bad where the
tacking results in giving the senior mortgagee one lien for both sums, rather
than two liens which he could assert independently; but the rule is more
harsh as applied to a junior mortgagee, since it gives him a junior lien for
the total amount when part of the amount was originally a first lien. This
refusal to permit a prior claim for the taxes is sometimes based on the
theory that the junior mortgagee has contracted for a lesser security for
taxes as well as for the mortgage debt.41 However, limiting a junior mort-
gagee in this way seems to give the senior one an advantage which he
neither bargained for nor expected. Realizing that this rule is not logical
and that it discourages a junior lien holder from paying taxes, some juris-
dictions allow him to be subrogated to a lien of the same rank as the tax
lien 42 and New York permits him to exercise his two liens independent of
one another.43
No matter how many mortgages there are on the property, the mort-
gagor is considered the owner and, as such, remains liable for the taxes.
Ordinarily a tax sale will destroy all mortgage liens, and therefore all
mortgagees have the right that the mortgagor pay the tax. Although no
mortgagee has the right that another should pay, each mortgagee has the
privilege, in order to protect his own interests, of doing so.
35. Zuege v. Nebraska Mtge. Co., 92 Kan. 272, o40 Pac. 855 (I9g4).
36. Id. at 273, 140 Pac. at 855.
37. This reasoning might still be outweighed by the desire to encourage the mort-
gagee to pay the taxes at an earlier date.
38. Cases so holding from Ill., Iowa, Mich., Miss., N. H., and Wash., are cited in
5 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL. PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1425 n. ii.
39. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wickhem, 9 S. D. 341, 69 N. W. 14 (I896).
40. Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369, 53 Atl. 899 (1903) ; New England L. & T. Co.
v. Robinson, 56 Neb. 5o, 76 N. W. 415 (1898) ; Johnson v. Bank of N. Richmond, 188
Wis. 620, 2o6 N. W. 871 (1926).
41. Cantley v. Danahen, 191 Ark. 733, 87 S. W. (2d) 8rL (935).
42. Noeker v. Howry, ii Mich. 626, 78 N. W. 669 (1899) ; McKenzie v. Evans,
96 Mont. 1, 29 P. (2d) 657 (1934); Chrisman v. Hough, 146 Mo. 1O2, 47 S. W. 941
(1898) ; Fiacre v. Chapman, 32 N. J. Eq. 463 (x88o).
43. Union Trust Co. of Rochester v. Simpson, 2o N. Y. Supp. 859 (1936).
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However, if payment by the junior mortgagee prevents the senior one
from foreclosing under an acceleration clause, the junior mortgagee is
limited to recovering the amount so paid only after the senior mortgagee
has received his share.4 4  If the only purpose of the acceleration clause
were to prevent defaults which would impair the security, this result would
not be very laudatory. When it is realized, however, that a tax default
may be an indication of financial irresponsibility of the mortgagor or a sign
that the land is declining in value, this right to accelerate is seen to be
extremely important.45  Furthermore, payment in this situation is not
primarily to prevent a tax sale, but to prevent the senior mortgagee from
destroying the value of the junior mortgagee's lien by accelerating the
maturity. Thus the result is justifiable.
Just as the mortgagor cannot set up a tax title against a senior mort-
gagee, he cannot do so against a junior one. And, if the senior mortgagee
cannot assert a tax title against the mortgagor, he may not assert it against
the junior mortgagee.4 6
The same reasoning that precludes a senior mortgagee from buying
a good tax title is applicable to a junior mortgagee. 47 However, not all
jurisdictions permitting the senior mortgagee to buy a good tax title allow
the junior mortgagee to do so. This result is reached on the theory that
the junior mortgagee, having an interest in the equity of redemption only,
is in a position similar to that of the mortgagor.48  This limitation upon
the junior mortgagee has been carried to the point where he may not buy
a good tax title, even after foreclosure by the senior mortgagee has de-
stroyed his lien, so long as the statutory period of redemption has not run.49
THE SITUATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
This problem has been treated differently in Pennsylvania. Since
Hogg v. Longstreth,50 in I88I, an action in general assumpsit was available
to the mortgagee for taxes paid. This case involved taxes accruing while
the equity of redemption was owned by a non-assuming grantee of the
mortgagor. The mortgagee foreclosed and purchased the title at the sale
for less than the amount of the accrued taxes. Subsequently, to prevent
his title from being divested, the mortgagee paid the outstanding accrued
taxes and was permitted to recover that amount from the non-assuming
grantee. The court used general quasi-contract language to permit the
recovery: "He who is compelled to pay another's debt, because of his [the
debtor's] omission to do so, may recover on the ground that the law infers
that the debtor requested such payment." 11 Although the facts of this
case present the mortgagee's claim for an independent action in general
assumpsit in its strongest light,5 °2 the language of the decision is broad
enough to allow such a recovery in a .great variety of situations.
44. Cantley v. Danahen, 191 Ark. 733, 87 S. W. (2d) 8I (935); Warranty Bldg.
& Loan Ass. v. Cimirro Constr. Co., iii N. J. Eq. 8, i6o Atl. 847 (932) ; Laventall
v. Pomerantz, 263 N. Y. Ino, I88 N. E. 271 (1933) ; Buskirk v. State-Planters' Bank
& Trust Co., 113 W. Va. 764, i69 S. E. 738 (933).
45. Ibid. and (934) 29 ILL. L. REv. 123.
46. 5 TFANY, LAw OF REAL PaoPmrY (3d ed. 1939) § 1425 n. io and text thereto.
47. Chrisman v. Hough, 146 Mo. 102, 47 S. W. 941 (i8g8).
48. (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rxv. 93. Even though bought from a third person who
bought at the sale, the title could not be set up against the first mortgagee.
49. Baird v. Fischer, 57 N. D. 167, 22o N. W. 343 (1929), 29 COL. L. REv. 93.
50. 97 Pa. 255 (i88I).
5I. Id. at 26o.
52. Assuming of course that the bid represents the full value of the land.
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Subsequent cases broadened the application of this doctrine. The
mortgagee in these cases was permitted to recover in general assumpsit,
even though the tax payment was made out of the proceeds of the fore-
closure sale, the proceeds being sufficient to pay the accrued taxes in full.5"
Once again the defendants were non-assuming grantees, and hence not
liable for the mortgage debt. This situation did not present as many
equities in the mortgagee's favor as the Hogg case because here he did
not make a direct payment from his own pocket. These decisions, more-
over, did not stress the fact that the defendant was a non-assuming grantee.
Thus, when the situation arose where the defendant was other than a non-
assuming grantee, the courts continued to apply the same rule.54
Finally, in Sloan v. Hirsch,55 it was argued that Hogg v. Longstrath
and the cases following it were unique since they arose under a statute
applying to Philadelphia which allowed the taxing body to sue in assumpsit
for the taxes, and that the mortgagee was allowed the taxing body's rights
on the theory of subrogation rather than on an independent contract right.
This argument was refused; the court held that so long as the tax statute
made the tax a personal liability of the registered owner,5 6 general assumpsit
would lie. On this basis, a mortgagee, attempting to secure a double re-
covery, brought assumpsit against the registered owner (a non-assuming
grantee) after having been paid by the mortgagor the full amount of the
mortgage debt and tax expenditures.5 7 As would be expected, the court
held that one payment barred a second recovery.
When it was clear that the grantee was an irresponsible person to
whom title had been transferred to relieve the mortgagor of the tax burden,
Pennsylvania has even allowed recovery against the mortgagor or his
grantee at the mortgagee's option.58 However, where the transferee is the
naked holder of the title with the mortgagor remaining the real owner so
far as receipt of benefits are concerned, a mortgagee knowing the facts could
not recover from the registered owner.55 Just why the court reached this
result is not too apparent. The case has been criticized 60 because the
grantee is the prima facie owner and it would seem to be his own fault if
he were held liable for the taxes. The uniqueness of the case is on its facts
because it is seldom that such transferees have anything worth suing for.
But where the transferee was given the title for security purposes and
also had the right to possession, the court held that this was not such a
naked ownership as would relieve him of liability.61
53. King v. Mount Vernon Bldg. Ass'n., lo6 Pa. 165 (1884); Fleisher v. Black-
burn, 15 Pa. Super. 289 (igoo); Republic Bldg. Ass'n v. Webb, 12 Pa. Super. 545
(19oo).
54. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. De Lucia, 86 P. L. J. 328 (C. P. Allegheny
Co. 1938). Of course, in this situation, the policy of settling all claims in one action
becomes so strong that the result reached by the Pennsylvania courts is open to crit-
icism.
55. 3o D. & C. 163 (Pa. 1937).
56. For a case holding that general assumpsit will not lie if the debt is not a per-
sonal liability upon the registered owner, see Theobald v. Sylvester, 27 Pa. Super. 362
(I9O5).
57. Becker v. Roth, 27 D. & C. 58o (Pa. 1936).
58. Penna. Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Bergson, 307
Pa. 44, 159 Atl. 32 (1932) ; Fidelity Ins. Trust and Safe Dep. Co. v. Second Phoenix
Bldg. and Loan Assn., 17 Pa. Super. 270 (I9OI).
59. Rawle v. Renshaw, I5 Pa. Super. 488 (I9OO).
6o. See opinion of Justice Kephart in the Bergson case, cited note 58 supra, at 56,
159 Atl. at 35.
6i. Phila. Co. for Guaranteeing Mortgages v. Hendricks, io4 Pa. Super. 3IO, 158
Atl. 577 (932) ; Metropolitan Trust v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 12 D.
98
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Although an action in general assumpsit does not give the mortgagee
either a lien or a preferred claim on the land, the mortgagee usually does
not suffer thereby because often he was the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. The mortgagee is permitted to recover in a convenient manner against
the party primarily liable for the taxes, independent of recovery of the
mortgage debt. Furthermore, when the situation arises where the mort-
gagee desires subrogation, the Pennsylvania courts will allow it.62 No case
has arisen in Pennsylvania where a first mortgagee wanted to be subro-
gated to the state's lien without tacking the lien to his mortgage debt. In
every case that has arisen, he has been content to recover for taxes and
debt in one proceeding. But there seems to be no Pennsylvania policy
which would require him to combine both liens.
683
The fundamental policy is to encourage the payment of taxes. There-
fore, a rule should be adopted which tends to encourage payment by anyone
who has an interest therein. Pennsylvania, by permitting the mortgagee
to recover within the bounds of general quasi-contract and equitable prin-
ciples, has given this encouragement and therefore seems to have developed
the best solution to this problem.
N.H.A.
& C. 73 (Pa. 1929) ; Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. Shoemaker, 13 W. N. C. 255 (Pa.
Supreme Court 1884), aff'g ii W. N. C. 284 (C. P. 1883).
62. See Pennsylvania Co., etc. v. Bergson, 307 Pa. 44, 55, 159 Atl. 32, 35 (1932),
and cases cited therein.
63. It has been pointed out in § 103 of the Pennsylvania Ainotations to the Restate-
meit of Restitutinr that the Pennsylvania cases make no reference to statutes under
which the ordinary tax sale will not divest otherwise prior mortgages, recorded before
the tax became a lien. The question is raised as to whether under these statutes the
mortgagee is not a volunteer when he pays taxes. Perhaps the answer can be found in
Note Divestiture of Lies in Pennsylvania [(1940) 89 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 373, 383]
where reference is made to a 1923 statute [PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 53,
§2o5i], which provides a specific method for a tax sale which will divest all liens.
The subsequent acts do not seem to have repealed it. Thus, sale under a tax lien still
has the power to divest a previous mortgage lien. See, also, City of Erie v. A Piece
of Land, etc., 14 A. (2d) 428 (Pa. 1940), (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. ig.
